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CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE: WHAT IT Is, AND WHAT IT ISN'T,
IN MISSISSIPPI EMPLOYMENT LAW
R. Pepper Crutcher, Jr *
Phelps Dunbar, L.L.P
When an irate employee threatens to "quit and sue," is she holding a gun to her
employer's head, or to hers? Answering that question requires knowledge of the
law of constructive discharge, the federal component of which is well-settled.
Mississippi constructive discharge law is of relatively recent vintage. This arti-
cle is offered to help the general practitioner determine whether Mississippi law
will burden the employer or the employee with the consequences of her resigna-
tion.
I. THE CONCEPT OF CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE
Employers today are burdened by a thick catalogue of rules limiting their right
to end an unsatisfactory employment relationship. Employers are fairly charged
with knowledge of many, such as express employment contracts and those
implied from employment policies. And most employers have some knowledge
of major federal anti-discrimination laws. But regardless of the source, or the
employer's notice of a legal duty not to discharge an employee, courts permit an
employee who has quit to state a discharge claim if she can prove that her resig-
nation was a "constructive discharge."1
Constructive discharge is the legally-inferred equivalent of an express dis-
charge. Rather like conspiracy, the term suffers from guilt by association. If an
employer lawfully may discharge an employee expressly, it may constructively
discharge her without liability Liability arises only when express discharge
would have been forbidden.'
Courts weighing constructive discharge claims use a variant of the reasonable
person standard." Did the employer make the employee's working conditions so
intolerable as to compel the resignation of any reasonable person? If so, the
employer constructively discharged the employee. Formally, the question is
objective.5 That is, the employee need not prove that the employer intended to
force her to quit, only that the employer intended to create the intolerable cir-
cumstances and that the employee's resulting resignation was the foreseeable act
of a reasonable person.' Consequently, some have remarked that a constructive
discharge claim may be premised on employer negligence.7
*The author would like to thank Brendon T. McLeod who is currently working at Troutman Sanders in Atlanta, Ga.
1. See Cothern v. Vickers, Inc., 759 So.2d 1241, 1245-46 (Miss. 2000).
2. See Junior v. Texaco, 688 F.2d 377, 378 (5th Cir. 1982).
3. See Miller v. Texas State Bd. of Bar Examiners, 615 F.2d 650, 652 (5th Cir. 1980).
4. See Cothem, 759 So.2d at 1246.
5. Id.
6. See Bullock v. City of Pascagoula, 574 So.2d 637, 640 (Miss. 1990).
7. See Fowler v. Carrolton Public Library, 799 F.2d 976, 980 (5th Cir. 1986) (dicta). Your authors think this a
legal fiction, but it is a logical extension of prior law and may determine insurance coverage, especially if the rele-
vant law imposes liability for negligent violations and the relevant policy excludes liability for intentional acts.
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As the reader suspects already, modifying holdings have developed into doc-
trines which push the result one way or the other in particular classes of cases.
Let us hence.
II. MississiPPi BoRRows FIFTH CIRCUIT LAW
The law which supplies the rule of decision for the discharge claim also sup-
plies the rule for deciding whether the employee's resignation was a constructive
discharge.8 Fortunately for our litigants and litigators, the Mississippi Supreme
Court has bought in bulk the constructive discharge law developed by the United
States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals under a broad range of federal employment
and civil rights statutes.' This has so far produced uniform results regardless of
the forum or law chosen by litigants.
Originally, the Fifth Circuit borrowed constructive discharge law developed by
the National Labor Relations Board to determine whether an employer had
craftily, or not so craftily, made work intolerable for a pro-union employee in
order to stifle union organizing or to punish him for his union activities." Like
other Board discrimination cases, the question required evaluation of the
employer's state of mind, most often inferred from circumstantial evidence."
Some Board opinions required proof that the employer intended to compel the
employee to quit.12 Other cases, with more or less clarity, required only that res-
ignation have been a reasonably foreseeable result of the employer's badly moti-
vated abuse.13 Early Fifth Circuit cases treating constructive discharges under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not remedy the confusion. 4 This
permitted Title VII defendants to attack such claims as a matter of law when
employees, reasonably and foreseeably compelled to quit, could produce no evi-
dence that the employer specifically intended to force resignation."i Sustaining
such defenses posed a practical problem in the days before the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 permitted Title VII plaintiffs to recover legal damages. If no discharge,
then no significant damages; if no significant damages, no incentive to sue. If
constructive discharge turned on the employer's specific intent, few employees
could or would make the claim. Consequently, a devious employer might evade
8. See Guthrie v. Tifco Industries, Inc., 941 F.2d 374, 376-77 (5th Cir. 1991).
9. Bulloch v. City of Pascagoula, 574 So.2d 637, 640-41 (Miss. 1990); Hoemer Boxes v. Mississippi
Employment Security Commission, 693 So.2d 1343, 1347 (Miss. 1997).
10. Young v. Southwestern Savings and Loan Association, 509 F.2d 140, 144 (5th Cir. 1975); Calcote v.
Texas Educational Foundation, Inc., 578 F.2d 95, 97 (5th Cir. 1978).
11. Young, 509 F.2d at 144-45; Calcote, 578 F.2d at 97-98.
12. See, e.g., Chem-Spray Filling Corp., 176 N.L.R.B. 754, 755 (1969) ("[The employer's conduct must be]
of a kind calculated to force her to quit."), quoting Action Wholesale, Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 627 (1963).
13. See Markus Hardware, Inc., 243 N.L.R.B. 903, 916 (1979) (citing objective standard as a means of judg-
ing the employer's intent); Borg Warner Corporation, 245 N.L.R.B. 513, 519 (1979) (distinguishing objective
constructive discharge finding from "a constructive discharge in the traditional sense", which requires evidence
that the employer created intolerable conditions "with the expectation or hope that he would voluntarily quit").
14. See Calcote v. Texas Educational Foundation, Inc., 578 F.2d at 98 (emphasizing that acts which forced
resignation were "deliberate").
15. See Muller v. United States Steel Corp., 509 F.2d 923, 929-30 (10th Cir. 1975)(where there is a "dearth




Title VII scrutiny by making a complaining employee miserable, and if she quit,
all the better.
No Fifth Circuit opinion explained the shift toward objectification in these
terms, but the shift clearly occurred, and had the effect of defeating that employ-
er tactic. By 1990, Fifth Circuit panels were consistently and clearly disavowing
prior suggestions that a constructive discharge plaintiff must prove that her
employer specifically intended to force her to quit. 6 But could a plaintiff with
some evidence of race, sex, or age-based discrimination quit a genuinely stress-
ful job and escape pre-trial dismissal of her constructive discharge claim? The
Fifth Circuit would not take objectification this far." The Fifth Circuit approach
to constructive discharge takes account of the underlying statutory policy, and of
opportunities for abuse, and so has led to predictable if different results in differ-
ent classes of cases.
A state, county or municipal employee who has a legal right to be discharged
only for some cause also has a Fourteenth Amendment "property interest" in her
job, and so deserves a due process hearing of some sort before the governing
body may deprive her of it.'" This does not fit neatly with constructive dis-
charge claims, since the constructive discharge plaintiff concedes that no formal
action was taken to terminate her employment. The Fifth Circuit solution is that,
"Constructive discharge in a procedural due process case constitutes a § 1983
claim only if it amounts to forced discharge to avoid affording pretermination
hearing procedures." 9 This is a question of the employer's specific intent."
Almost all employment discharge suits allege purposeful wrongs. It is practi-
cally, and therefore conceptually difficult, to separate objective constructive dis-
charge analysis from the question of the employer's subjective motive. After all,
there is no liability for a constructive discharge unless motivated by the prohibit-
ed state of mind. One solution - intended or not - is to raise the bar of objec-
tive intolerability. In Landgrafv. USI Film Products, 968 F.2d 427, 430 (5th Cir.
1992), aff'd, 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 119 (1994), the Court
made express what had been implicit in Title VII sex harassment cases, "To
prove constructive discharge, the plaintiff must demonstrate a greater severity or
pervasiveness of harassment than the minimum required to prove a hostile work-
ing environment."'" The more relatively intolerable the circumstances, the bet-
ter the bet that the employer created them for the prohibited purpose.22
The spectrum of employer intent which runs from reasonable foreseeability to
specific intent is wide enough to avoid Hobson's choices. If pushed to either
end, law focused upon the employer's state of mind might hold employers liable
16. See Jurgens v. EEOC, 903 F.2d 386, 390-92 (5th Cir. 1990); Boze v. Branstetter, 912 F.2d 801, 804-05
(5th Cir. 1990).
17. See Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 968 F.2d 427, 429-30 (5th Cir. 1992)(sexually harassed employee's
constructive discharge claim dismissed as matter of law because reasonable employee would not have felt com-
pelled to resign).
18. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1985).
19. Fowler v. Carrolton Public Library, 799 F.2d 976, 981 (5th Cir. 1986).
20. Id. at 980.
21. See also Weller v. Citation Oil & Gas Corp., 84 F.3d 191, 195 n. 7 (5th Cir. 1996).
22. This is the author's hypothesis. The Fifth Circuit did not explain the quoted holding in this way.
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to employees whose known hypersensitivity to minor slights prompted their res-
ignations. It does not. There is no thin-skulled plaintiff rule. The employee's
actual humiliation does not make a constructive discharge case. Rather, courts
look to the character of the employer's intentional conduct, and the foreseeable
effect of that conduct upon a hypothetical reasonable person. 3
Similarly, plaintiffs lose when others who experienced the same working con-
ditions tolerated them. 4
Some resignations are disallowed as a matter of statutory policy. For example,
courts presume almost conclusively that a hypothetical, reasonable pay discrimi-
nation plaintiff would contest the disparity while remaining on the job.
25
Finally, there is the matter of timing. Suffering intolerable working conditions
apparently aimed at you does not give you tenure. The evidence must permit a
reasonable juror to infer that you quit because of those conditions.2" That usual-
ly translates into the conditions prevailing when you quit. The longer you wait,
the more tenuous that inference. Delays ranging from to four to thirteen months
have been judged too long. On the other hand, you are not entitled to presume
the worst and jump ship upon slight or isolated provocation.28
III. THE EASY CASES
The proper result in some cases is clear because the dismissal is in no sense
constructive. Most concern employees expressly forced to choose between res-
ignation and discharge.29 In other cases, employers have accepted resignations
not tendered,3" or have told the employee to use his short time remaining to find
another job. 1 The same effect is achieved when an employer replaces the
employee while offering only part time work in a demeaning capacity. 2 In all
23. Jett v. Dallas Independent School District, 798 F.2d 748, 755 (5th Cir. 1986), aff'd in part and remanded
inpart, 491 U.S. 701, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989), on remand, 7 F.3d 1241 (5th Cir. 1993);
Cothem v. Vickers, Inc., 759 So.2d 1241, 1245-47 (Miss. 2000).
24. Redd Pest Control Company, Inc. v. Foster, 761 So.2d 967, 971 (Miss. App. 2000); Benningfield v. City
of Houston, 157 F.3d 369, 376-77 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 1457 (1999); Jurgens v. EEOC, 903
F.2d 386, 391 n. 7 (5th Cir. 1990); Barrow v. New Orleans Steamship Association, 10 F.3d 292, 297-98 (5th
Cir. 1994); Bodnar v. Synpol, Inc., 843 F.2d 190, 192 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908, 109 S.Ct. 260,
102 L.Ed.2d 248 (1988); Kelleher v. Flawn, 761 F.2d 1079, 1086-87 (5th Cir. 1985); Junior v. Texaco, 688 F.2d
377, 380 (5th Cir. 1982).
25. Bourque v. Powell Electrical Manufacturing Co., 617 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1980); Pittman v. Hattiesburg
Municipal Separate School District, 644 F.2d 1071, 1076 (5th Cir. 1980).
26. See Stephens v. C.I.T. Group/Equipment Financing, Inc., 955 F.2d 1023, 1027 (5th Cir. 1992).
27. Vaughn v. Pool Offshore Co., 683 F.2d 922, 926 (5th Cir. 1982) (about four months after severe racial
hazing aboard offshore rig); McKethan v. Texas Farm Bureau, 996 F.2d 734, 740-41 (5th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 1046, 114 S.Ct. 694, 126 L.Ed.2d 661 (1994) (thirteen months after humiliating speech).
28. Ugalde v. W.A. McKenzie Asphalt Co., 990 F.2d 239, 242-43 (5th Cir. 1993) (employee quit after super-
visor called him a "wetback"); Ward v. Bechtel Corp., 102 F.3d 199, 202 (5th Cir. 1997) (manager quit prompt-
ly after company refused to fire subordinate who elbowed and threatened her); Webb v. Cardiothoracic Surgery
Associates of North Texas, P.A., 139 F.3d 532, 535, 539-40 (5th Cir. 1998) (isolated outbursts and indignities).
29. See Bueno v. City of Donna, 714 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1983); Findeisen v. North East Independent School
District, 749 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, __ U.S. _, 105 S.Ct. 2657, 86 L.Ed.2d 274 (1985).
30. See Brown v. East Mississippi Electric Power Association, 989 F.2d 858, 863 (5th Cir. 1993) (employee,
given two weeks to choose demotion or resignation, received notice after one week that his resignation had
been accepted)
31. See Faruki v. Parsons, S.I.E, Inc., 123 F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1997).




such cases, the employer expressly puts it to the employee that continued
employment is not an option. If this evidence is believed, then the case should
be classed as an express discharge. If litigated as a constructive discharge, the
claimant normally wins despite the misnomer.3
IV. HARD CASES
In employment relationships, as in others, the parties sometimes draw oppos-
ing conclusions from ambiguous communications. The employee, believing that
she has been fired, fails to return to work. The employer, knowing that the
employee is displeased, interprets her departure as her resignation. The
Mississippi Supreme Court tackled such a case in Huckabee v. Mississippi
Employment Security Commission, 735 So.2d 390 (Miss. 1999). Ms. Huckabee
complained to her supervisor that her convenience store job required the effort of
two people. 4 The boss asked Ms. Huckabee if she were looking for another
job. s Huckabee replied that she would look for another job while she continued
working. The boss said that she would have to replace Huckabee, and
Huckabee promised to give two weeks notice when she found another job. The
conversation ended with the boss giggling as she said, "I'm hiring somebody
else." Huckabee took this to mean that she had been fired. 9 When she came
back to get her final paycheck, her boss assumed that she had quit."
The dispute was tried before an appeals referee of the Mississippi
Employment Security Commission, in order to determine whether Ms.
Huckabee had disqualified herself for unemployment compensation by leaving
work voluntarily without good cause."1 On this question, she bore the burden to
prove by a preponderance of evidence that she had not. 2 The referee, then the
full Commission Review Board, found her evidence wanting. 3 As they saw it,
the employer reasonably believed that Ms. Huckabee had quit." So did the
Mississippi Supreme Court, originally. The Court rejected Ms. Huckabee's
constructive discharge analysis, since her boss had done nothing to make her
working conditions intolerable. 6 Either this was an express discharge, or
none. 7 If none, then Ms. Huckabee had the burden to prove a good cause for
33. See Stephens, 955 F.2d at 1027 (employee was demoted, his salary cut, and employer badgered him to
resign); Christopher v. Mobil Oil Corp., 950 F.2d 1209, 1214-15 (5th Cir. 1992)(employees offered choice
between retirement or continued employment, both on unfavorable terms).







41. Id. at 392-93.
42. Miss. Code Ann. § 71-5-513(A)(l)(a), (c). Neither the original opinion nor the rehearing opinion dis-
cussed the parties' proof burden, apparently because the statute required the Court to defer to the MESC if its
finding was supported by substantial evidence.
43. See Huckabee, 735 So.2d at 393.
44. Id.
45. See Huckabee v. Mississippi Employment Security Commission, 722 So.2d 590, 1998 WL 718357
(Miss. 1998) (withdrawn from bound volume).
46. Id. at 595-96.
47. Id. at 590-92.
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leaving. 8 If so, the statute required the Court to defer to the Commission's
finding if supported by substantial evidence. 9 Since there was contradicting
evidence, the Court deferred to the Commission. s"
On rehearing, the Court reversed itself, holding that the original opinion had
asked and answered the wrong questions." "The issue before this Court is
whether an employee who abandons the workplace under the reasonable belief
that she has been discharged should be classified as a 'discharged' employee and
eligible for benefits or classified as a 'voluntary quit' employee and not eligible
for benefits." 2 The Court viewed this by analogy to cases in which the employer
fires the employee who announces an intent to resign at a future date. 3 In dis-
sent, Justice Smith again argued that there was no proof of constructive dis-
charge. 4 The majority agreed, holding that constructive discharge principles
were "not germane." 5
A similar problem of legal taxonomy arises when an employee quits under the
reasonable belief that his employer has signaled its intent to fire him by circum-
stances which are not otherwise intolerable.58 These cases have gone both ways,
with the Fifth Circuit relying on a descriptive analysis with little predictive
value. 7 The Fifth Circuit has treated the employee's resignation as a discharge
when the adverse circumstances fairly may be called a "harbinger of dis-
missal."5 8 Thus, in an age discrimination case, a 19% pay cut will support resig-
nation if the employee also is forced to work for a less qualified junior, is forced
to explain his demotion to his client, and is asked continually when he will quit. 9
But similar pay cuts without such extreme, aggravating factors do not send the
same fatal signal."0 In age discrimination cases, the Fifth Circuit has looked to
this non- exclusive list of factors to answer this question.
(1) demotion; (2) reduction in salary; (3) reduction in job responsibilities; (4)
reassignment to menial or degrading work; (5) reassignment to work under a
younger supervisor; (6) badgering, harassment, or humiliation by the employer
48. Id. at 591.
49. Id. at 591-92.
50. Id. at 596.
51. See Huckabee, 735 So.2d at 392.
52. Id. at 394.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 397-98 (Smith, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 396.
56. This is inferred from the Fifth Circuit's refusal to sustain claims based on seemingly less tolerable cir-
cumstances without proof that the employer intended thereby to send a message of impending termination to
this particular employee. See Jurgens v. EEOC, 903 F.2d at 391 n. 7; Boze v. Branstetter, 912 F.2d at 804-05;
Benningfield v. City of Houston, 157 F.3d at 376-77.
57. See Jurgens, 903 F.2d at 390-92 (employee who resigned after employer's discriminatory denial of pro-
motion and non-discriminatory demotion not constructively discharged).
58. Stephens, 955 F.2d at 1028.
59. Id. at 1027.
60. McCann v. Litton Systems, Inc., 986 F.2d 946, 950-53 (5th Cir. 1993) (12% pay cut, forced to work for
junior). See also Guthrie v. Tifco Industries, 941 F.2d 374, 377 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 908, 112




calculated to encourage employee's resignation; or (7) offers of early retirement
on terms that would make the employee worse off whether the offer was accept-
ed or not.8'
It is not clear whose state of mind is being delved by this inquiry.
CONCLUSION
The Mississippi employee who threatens to quit and sue likely will win if she
quits promptly and if the evidence shows that her employer, expressly or by clear
implication, required her to choose resignation or dismissal. But clear proof of a
specific employer intent to prompt her resignation is not absolutely necessary.
Her claim may succeed if the evidence shows that her employer intentionally
created such intolerable working conditions that he should have foreseen that
any reasonable person in her position would quit, and if she indeed quit because
of those conditions. But, her "constructive discharge" is actionable only if her
express discharge would have been actionable.
61. Barrow v. New Orleans Steamship Association, 10 F.3d 292, 297-98 (5th Cir. 1994).
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